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In the online video game industry, a significant portion of the revenue is generated from microtransactions, where a small amount of real-world currency is exchanged for virtual items to be used in the game. One popular way to conduct microtransactions is via a loot box, which is a random allocation of virtual items whose contents are not revealed until after purchase. In this work, we consider how to optimally price and design loot boxes from the perspective of a revenue-maximizing video game company and analyze customer surplus under such selling strategies. Our paper provides the first formal treatment of loot boxes, with the aim to provide customers, companies, and regulatory bodies with insights into this popular selling strategy. We consider two types of loot boxes: a traditional one where customers can receive (unwanted) duplicates and a unique one where customers are guaranteed to never receive duplicates. We show that as the number of virtual items grows large, the unique box strategy is asymptotically optimal among all possible strategies, whereas the traditional box strategy only garners 36.7% of the optimal revenue. On the other hand, the unique box strategy leaves almost zero customer surplus, whereas the traditional box strategy leaves positive surplus. Further, when designing traditional and unique loot boxes, we show it is asymptotically optimal to allocate the items uniformly, even when the item valuation distributions are heterogeneous. We also show that, when the seller purposely misrepresents the allocation probabilities, their revenue may increase significantly, and thus, strict regulation is needed. Finally, we show that, even if the seller allows customers to salvage unwanted items, then the customer surplus can only increase by at most 1.4%. This paper was accepted by Victor Martinez-de-Albeniz, operations management. 

We develop a variant of the multinomial logit model with impatient customers and study assortment optimization and pricing problems under this choice model. In our choice model, a customer incrementally views the assortment of available products in multiple stages. The patience level of a customer determines the maximum number of stages in which the customer is willing to view the assortments of products. In each stage, if the product with the largest utility provides larger utility than a minimum acceptable utility, which we refer to as the utility of the outside option, then the customer purchases that product right away. Otherwise, the customer views the assortment of products in the next stage as long as the customer’s patience level allows the customer to do so. Under the assumption that the utilities have the Gumbel distribution and are independent, we give a closed-form expression for the choice probabilities. For the assortment-optimization problem, we develop a polynomial-time algorithm to find the revenue-maximizing sequence of assortments to offer. For the pricing problem, we show that, if the sequence of offered assortments is fixed, then we can solve a convex program to find the revenue-maximizing prices, with which the decision variables are the probabilities that a customer reaches different stages. We build on this result to give a 0.878-approximation algorithm when both the sequence of assortments and the prices are decision variables. We consider the assortment-optimization problem when each product occupies some space and there is a constraint on the total space consumption of the offered products. We give a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for this constrained problem. We use a data set from Expedia to demonstrate that incorporating patience levels, as in our model, can improve purchase predictions. We also check the practical performance of our approximation schemes in terms of both the quality of solutions and the computation times.